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Using the Theories of Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and
Procedural Justice to Reconceptualize Brazil's
Rejection of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Nancy A. Welsh
Andrea Kupfer Schneider
Kathryn Rimpfel*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, investor-state arbitration has made tremendous
gains in both credibility and use. There is now widespread accession
to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention" or
"Washington Convention").' States have executed more than 2,000
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) defining the terms and conditions
under which one ("investor") state's nationals and companies will
invest in the other ("host") state. 2 Such terms include provisions
allowing foreign investors to initiate arbitration proceedings against
the host state, and at this point, more than 500 disputes have been

* Nancy A. Welsh, William Trickett Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State
University, Dickinson School of Law; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Professor of Law and
Director, Dispute Resolution Program, Marquette University Law School; Kathryn Rimpfel,
J.D. (2014), Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law. The authors thank the
participants of the Washington University School of Law Global Dispute Resolution
Scholarship Roundtable for their insightful comments. Any errors or omissions are, of course,
our own.
1. "There are currently 158 signatory States to the ICSID Convention." Member States,
INT'L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INv. Disps., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front

Servlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=MemberStates
visited Nov. 2, 2013).
2.

Home

(last

Bilateral Investment Treaties, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/

bilateral investment treaty (last visited Apr. 5, 2014). The U.N. Conference on Trade &
Development (UNCTAD) reported 2,495 bilateral investment treaties as of 2005. U.N. CoNF.
ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INV.

REPORT 2006, FDI FROM DEV. & TRANSITION ECONS.:

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEV., at xix, U.N. Sales No. E.06.IID. 11 (July 2006).
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submitted to investor-state arbitration. There is, however, one very
notable example of a rapidly developing state that has rejected this
system of international dispute resolution in favor of nation-level
structures. That example is the largely industrialized state of Brazil.
Brazil boasts the seventh largest economy in the world,4 $65
billion in foreign direct investment,s and enticing investment
opportunities in advance of its hosting of the 2014 World Cup and
2016 Olympic Games. But Brazil does not have a single BIT in
force.6 Brazil's notorious absence from international investment
arbitration has been described as the product of the region's recent
economic history, coupled with technical and political barriers that
have impeded the ratification of BITs in particular. Some
commentators have also found that Brazil's failure to enact BITs and
its general avoidance of international forums for dispute resolution
are largely the result of shifting priorities on the part of the executive
branch of the Brazilian government, as will be discussed in Part
III, infra.
Those who are most interested in international investment
arbitration often present Brazil's choice not to ratify its BITs as
problematic and, indeed, as a failure. This label, however, is only
used by certain audiences in assessing Brazil's actions. Using
Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty-supplemented by
procedural justice research and theory-a different conclusion
emerges. The failure of Brazil's executive and legislative branches to
reach agreement on BITs represents a story of Brazilian legislators'
exit from the product that had been negotiated by the state's
diplomats. But this exit also evidences the executive's

3.

International Investment Disputes Hit Record in 2012, UN NEWS CTR. (Apr. 10,

2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.aspNewslD=44616#.Uwj7DfOwwds.
4. Ben Tavener, Brazil Slides to 7th World Economy, Rio TIMES (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/brazil-slides-to-7th-world-economy/.
5.

ORG. ECON. COOP. & DEV., FDJ IN FIGURES (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.

oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI%20in%20figures.pdf.
6. Elizabeth Whitsitt & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Yes or
No?, INV. TREATY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2008), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/11/30/investmentarbitration -in-brazil-yes-or-no/; ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT'L CTR.
FOR THE SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?Request

Type=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Main.
7. For a discussion of the arguments for and against ratification of Brazilian BITs, see
Whitsitt & Vis-Dunbar, supra note 6.
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acknowledgement and even-handed, dignified treatment of the voice
expressed by Brazilian legislators. Ultimately, such voice and
acknowledgement led to executive and legislative collaboration in the
creation of new, unbundled legislation that responded to state
concerns while also providing sufficient protection to foreign
investors. Such products include: constitutional equal protection for
foreign investors, protections for the free flow of capital, double
taxation treaties, investment opportunities through privatization and
concessions, and arbitration law reforms.
For Brazil's domestic constituents and its foreign investors, these
alternative approaches to investment protection actually represent
superior products that were more responsive than BITs to the needs
and interests of the state at that time. Far from representing failure,
then, the development of these products represents a success for
Brazil's domestic and foreign stakeholders. Perhaps as evidence of
this, foreign investment in Brazil continues to be strong.8
Meanwhile, Brazil's role in foreign investment has evolved as its
own multinational corporations increasingly engage in foreign
investment. Inevitably, these corporations seek to reduce the risk of
their foreign investments. As a result, they may encourage Brazil's
executive and legislative branches to take a second look at BITs. As
circumstances change, so may the definition of success.
This Article begins, in Part II, by describing the economic and
political context within which Brazil began its consideration of BITs.
Part III recounts Brazil's history with BITs in some detail. Part IV
examines alternative investment protection legislation adopted in
Brazil. Part V then turns to Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and
loyalty, as well as the theories and research of procedural justice, to
8. While the Brazilian economy has certainly taken a downturn since its historic rise
after the global financial crisis, see Has Brazil Blown It?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2013, available

at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586833-stagnant-economy-bloated-state-andmass-protests-mean-dilma-rousseff-must-change-course-has, the country accounted for "47
percent of South America's total [FDI] in 2013" and "remained significant at $63 billion."
Global Foreign Direct Investment Rises to Pre-Crisis Levels, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Jan. 28, 2014),

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/story.aspNewslD=47029&Cr=trade&Crl=#.UOHPHK
IdXgl; see also Gustavo Fernandes de Andrade & Gustavo Henrique Justino de Oliveira,
Investment Treaties, Foreign Investment and Brazilian Law: The Magic of Reality, in
INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 88-89 (Daniel de Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja &

Adriana Noemi Pucci eds.).
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apply them to Brazil's history with BITs and to consider the
particular relationship between procedural justice and loyalty.
Ultimately, the Article urges that Hirschman's theory and the theories
and research
regarding procedural justice encourage a
reconceptualization of Brazil's alleged "failure" in choosing not to
ratify the BITs that had been negotiated by its diplomats.
II. BRAZIL'S EVOLVING ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND INTEREST
IN THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

The Brazilian experience with BITs must be understood within the
larger context of the country's evolution in terms of economics and
politics. Brazil's approach to economic liberalization, meanwhile, fits
within the even larger context of economic trends occurring
worldwide and in the Latin American region.9 In particular, reaction
to the Mexican debt crisis of 198210 and Bolivian hyperinflation in
1985" led to a trend of economic liberalization in Latin America.12
Often, with guidance from international organizations such as the
World Bank, and with input from developed nations' experts, 13 Latin
American nations opened their economies to foreign competition.
Their goals were to achieve growth in their gross domestic product
and to gain the spillover effects of development. 14 The countries in
this region understood BITs would signal their interest in direct
9. See Leslie Bethell, Brazil and 'LatinAmerica,'42 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 457 (2010).
10. See Richard H.K. Vietor & Eilene Zimmerman, Mexico in Debt, Case No. 9-797-110,
HARV. Bus. REV., Feb. 12, 2001, at 3.
11. See Rafael Di Tella & Huw Pill, Bolivia: Globalization, Sovereignty, or Democracy?,
Case No. 9-702-086, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar. 12, 2003, at 5-7.
12. Daniel de Andrade Levy & Rodrigo Moreira, ICSID in Latin America: Where Does
Brazil Stand?, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 17, 20 (Daniel de Andrade Levy, Ana

Gerdau de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci eds., 2013) ("In the process of liberalization of the
Latin-American economies, known as the Apertura,where most public services were privatized
and access to natural resources-especially oil and gas-was conceded to international
companies, several BITs were signed in order to attract FDI [foreign direct investment], which
consequently led to the fall of the Calvo Doctrine in the region.").
13. See, e.g., the work of Jeffrey Sachs in Bolivia during the country's 1985 efforts
toward stabilizing hyperinflation. Jeffrey Sachs, The Bolivian Hyperinflationand Stabilization,
77 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 279 (1987), available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/
sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/AER0587_OOO.pdf.
14.

See ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND POVERTY: LATIN AMERICA IN

THE 1990s (Rob Vos, Lance Taylor & Ricardo Paes de Barros eds., 2002).
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foreign investment, and would promote such investment by providing
certain substantive assurances to investors and a neutral method of
resolving any dispute that might arise. 5 Brazil's execution of a wave
of BITs in the mid-1990s, therefore, was entirely consistent with a
worldwide16 and Latin American phenomenon. 1
During this period, Brazil transitioned from a military government
with a largely closed economy, guided by import substitution
industrialization

principles,"

to

a

civilian-led,

constitutional

democracy.1 9

Fernando Collor de Mello, the first popularly elected
Brazilian president after the conclusion of the military regime,
established largely neoliberal economic policies during the early
1990s. His successor, Itamar Franco, 20 continued such policies. These
policies were aimed at attracting and protecting investment, 21 and

15. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Privatizing
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523

(2005).
16. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of BilaterialInvestment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998) ("As of July 1996,

there were 1010 BITs in existence around the globe, more than half of which have been signed
or brought into force since the start of 1990.").
17. See Levy & Moreira, supra note 12, at 20.
18.

PEDRO DA MOTTA VEIGA, INTER-AMERICAN

DIALOGUE, BRAZIL'S STRATEGY FOR

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 2 (June

1996), available at http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Brazils%20Strategy%20for%
20Trade%20Liberalization%20and%20Economic%20Integration%20in%20the%20Western%2
OHemishpere.pdf. Import substitution industrialization is an economic policy adopted by many
developing countries, especially in Latin America, with the aim of supplementing economies
previously based solely on the export of agricultural products by substituting previously
imported manufactured goods with locally produced goods, thus increasing domestic
manufacturing opportunities and thus overall industrialization and development. The
consequence of this policy, it is argued, is a generally closed economy that utilizes trade
barriers to promote and protect local industry. See JEFFRY FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS
FALL AND RISE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 220-29 (2006); see also Werner Baer & Isaac
Kerstenetzky, Import Substitution and Industrializationin Brazil, 54 AM. ECON. REv. 411, 413-

14(1964).
19. See David V. Fleischer, Government and Politics, in BRAZIL: A COUNTRY STUDY 256
(Rex A. Hudson ed., 5th ed. 1998), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/brtoc.html.
20. Franco became President after Collor de Mello resigned after being impeached by the
Brazilian Congress. Jeb Blount & William R. Long, Brazil President Resigns in Wake of

Impeachment, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1992, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1992-1230/news/mn-2585 1_vice-president.
21. See Fleischer, supra note 19; Ross Schneider, Brazil Under Collor: Anatomy of a
Crisis, 8 WORLD POL'Y J. 321, 326 (1991); Francisco Panizza, Neopopulism and Its Limits in

Collor's Brazil, 19 BULL. OF LATIN AM. RES. 177, 184-86 (2000) (describing Collor's "high
risk strategy" of combining an anti-inflationary package, exchange rate liberalization, opening
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they included the country's accession to the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency Convention (MIGA),22 execution of doubletaxation treaties, 23 trade and financial liberalization, and the
privatization of state-owned entities.24 BIT negotiations also began
during this time. 25 Privatization was perhaps the most influential
factor in prompting the government to encourage investment
protection measures. The provision of risk reduction to foreign
investors would result in direct benefits to the government, which
to external competition, decreased import tariffs, and the National Privatisation Programme.
Panizza details the implementation of this strategy as one of "imposition rather than
negotiation," noting that "the plan was drafted in secret by a closed group of economic advisers,
mostly academics and businessmen, with no links to the techno-bureaucracy which had
traditionally dominated economic policy making in Brazil.").
22. MIGA, a branch of the World Bank Group, provides political risk insurance
guarantees to private sector investors, with the aim of promoting foreign direct investment. By
joining MIGA as a member country, investments (as defined by the MIGA convention) in the
country become eligible for a MIGA insurance guarantee, subject to approval by the host
country. MIGA, as an organization, also conducts research and works with developing countries
to improve the environment for FDI. See generally Convention Establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99, available at
http://www.miga.org/documents/miga convention november 2010.pdf. Brazil became a
MIGA member on January 7, 1993. Miga Members, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/

WBSITE/EXTERNAIJEXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20122866-menuPK:329836pagePK:
34542-piPK:329829-theSitePK:29708,00.html (last updated Nov. 11, 2013).
23. Double taxation treaties are bilateral agreements with the aim of preventing the
taxation of the same taxpayer with regards to the same subject matter for identical periods. This
occurs when countries adopt different theories of taxation that can overlap, e.g., one country
imposing taxes based on residency and another based on the source of income. Fabian Barthel,
Matthias Busse & Eric Neumayer, The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign Direct
Investment: Evidence from Large Dyadic Panel Data, 28 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y. 366, 367

(2010). Brazil has approximately twenty-eight DTTs in place, nine of which were negotiated
and signed between 1988 and 2002 (India in 1988, Korea in 1989, Netherlands in 1990, China
in 1991, Finland in 1996, Portugal in 2000, Chile in 2001, and Israel and Ukraine in 2002).
Three have been signed since 2002, and it has been reported that Brazil is actively negotiating
with other countries.

Double Taxation Conventions,

RECEITA FED., http://www.receita

.fazenda.gov.br/principallingles/Acordo/DuplaTributDefault.htm
see

also

Juliana

Mello,

Brazil

and

International

(last visited Mar. 18, 2014);

Tax

Treaties,

http://thebrazilbusiness.com/articlelbrazil-and-international-tax-treaties

BRAZIL

Bus.,

(May 4, 2012).

24. See Panizza, supra note 21; CELIO HIRATUKA, WORKING GRP. ON DEV. & ENv'T IN
THE AMs., FOREIGN DIRECT INV. & TRANSNAT'L CORPS. IN BRAZIL: RECENT TRENDS &

IMPACTS ON ECON. DEV. 1 (Apr. 2008), available at http://ase.tufts.edulgdae/Pubs/rp/DP10
HiratukaApr08.pdf.
25. Leany Lemos & Daniela Campello, The Non-Ratification of Bilateral Investment
Treaties in Brazil: A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation 7-8 (Princeton University
Department of Politics, April 1, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243120.
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26

sought to profit generously from the sale of state-owned entities.
With these various policy initiatives, Brazil made a concerted effort
to signal that the country was a safe and worthwhile investment.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso assumed the presidency in 1995 and
expanded upon Collor de Mello's initial principles. The Cardoso
administration's "Real Plan" included a series of monetary and
financial reforms, which involved a new phase of privatizations and
coincided with reductions in various trade barriers. 27 During this
time, Brazil began negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investments (MAI), and promulgated both concessions and
arbitration laws. This trend in policy both maximized governmental
interests and represented a reaction to a chorus of international
corporate and organizational calls for liberalization of foreign direct
investment. 28 At the time, Brazilian media encouraged policies to
attract investors and often highlighted rival Argentina's strategies in
privatization and market-based reforms.29 Multinational corporations
that had already initiated investments in Brazil also expressed interest
in investment protection.3 0 Importantly, however, the corporations
focused on issues such as cross-border capital transfers and national
treatment, rather than BITs in particular. This will be discussed in
Part IV, infra.31

In the midst of these economic and political developments, Brazil
continued to execute BITs. Further, as will be described in more
detail infra, the Brazilian Congress began to consider them for
ratification. The Brazilian executive branch also created an
26. Id. at 8. The Brazilian Congress also took steps in other areas of reform to increase the
attractiveness of its privatization program. For example, the 1997 reform to the Corporations
Law limited various minority shareholder rights, such as tag-along tender offers and reductions
in withdrawal rights, with the goal of making state-owned entities with minority shareholders
more attractive to large-scale buyers wishing to acquire controlling blocks. See Bruno M.
Salama & Viviane Muller Prado, Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders of Listed
Corporations in Brazil: Brief History, Legal Structure and Empirical Evidence 4-5 (Fundagao

Getulio Vargas Law School at Sao Paulo, May 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1856634.
27. VEIGA, supra note 18, at 3.

28. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 7-8; Whitsitt & Vis-Dunbar, supra note 6.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 7-8. These concepts were included in BITs, but were also addressed through
other legal forms, such as ordinary legislation, as will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
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Interministerial Working Group to develop a model BIT. Brazil's
negotiations over BITs, however, must be understood as largely
-32
reactive.
In most cases, the home states of international investors
initiated the negotiation process for Brazilian BITs as they sought to
assist their corporations with managing costs and risk.33 It has been
reported, for example, that countries like Germany sought to execute
BITs with Brazil based on the argument that without such
agreements, credit would be expensive for their citizen-investors.34
More systemically, Brazil's earlier accession to the MIGA pushed the
state toward BITs.35 If there is a BIT in place between an investor
country and the host country, MIGA considers there to be an
adequate level of legal protection.36 Without a BIT, on the other
hand, an applicant-foreign investor bears the burden of demonstrating
the host country has sufficient alternate legal protections regarding
fair and equitable treatment.3
Many countries had formally proposed BITs to the Brazilian
government as of 1990, and there were eleven negotiations under
way in 1993.38 This process produced fourteen signed BITs-with
Portugal, Chile, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Switzerland in
1994; Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Venezuela in
1995; Cuba in 1997; the Netherlands in 1998; and Belgium in 1999.39
(Much earlier, in 1966, Brazil had executed-and ratified-a BIT
with the United States. However, "it created an enormous
controversy, and never came to be applied." 4 0 ). The other fourteen
32. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9.
33. Id.; see also ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT'L CTR. FOR THE

SETTLEMENT INV. Disps., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.
34. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 7.

35. Id.
36. KARL SAUVANT, YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 559-

60 (2009-2010).
37. Id.
38. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9.
39. Paulo Macedo Garcia Neto, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: The Landscape of
Investment Arbitration in Brazil and Why Brazil Should become a More Important Player in the
Investment Arbitration Arena, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 3, 6 n.15 (Daniel de
Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci eds.).
40. Id. at 7. It is useful to recall that the U.S.-Brazil BIT likely was ratified during the
period when Brazil's military dictatorship was in power. TERESA A. MEADE, A BRIEF HISTORY
OF BRAZIL 164 (2010).
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signed BITs never even reached ratification, as described infra, and
ultimately were removed from consideration at the end of 2002.41
Having consistently been rated as a "safe harbour for
investments" 42 and an "investment grade country" 43 that receives the
fifth largest amount of foreign direct investment (FDI)" globally,45
Brazil's Foreign Affairs Ministry ("Itamaraty") has recently reinitiated investment-related negotiations in certain strategic
situations.4 6 There are reports of both negotiations and attempted
negotiations with Chile, Canada, India, and the European Union
(EU), and Brazil has signed approximately eleven memorandums of
understanding-mostly with fellow members of the Global South.4
41. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 7-8.
42. Neto, supra note 39, at 4.
43. Credit Trends: Emerging Markets Credit Metrics: Brazil Shows Positive Rating
Trends, STANDARD & POOR'S (Aug. 24, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://www.standardandpoors.com/
ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetlD=1245339022519.
44. The OECD provides the following definition of foreign direct investment: "FDI is
defined as cross-border investment by a resident entity in one economy with the objective of
obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy. The lasting interest
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise
and a significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the enterprise.
Ownership of at least 10% of the voting power, representing the influence by the investor, is the
basic criterion used." OECD Factbook 2013: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics,
OECD ILIBRARY (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2013-en/04/02/
01/index.html?itemld=/content/chapter/factbook-2013-34-en.
However, the definition of
"investment" in general is subject to significant debate, especially in the context of investment
treaty arbitration. See generally Tony Cole & Anuj Kumar Vaksha, Power-Conferring Treaties:
The Meaning of Investment' in the ICSID Convention, 24 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 305 (2011).

45. Daniel Tavela Luis & Luis Antonio Gongalves de Andrade, Expropriation in
Brazilian Law: An International Standard?, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 107, 107

(Daniel de Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci eds.).
46. Neto, supra note 39, at 7.
47. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 8. The Global South is used here as the
evolving synonym for the Third World. While the definitions of First and Second worlds have
been subject to different perspectives, the term "Third World" or "Global South" has been used
to refer to "Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans, that is the people of the countries located
roughly in three southern continents and sharing a history of underdevelopment and
colonialism." JACQUILINE ANNE BRAVEBOY-WAGNER,

1-2 (2009).
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Journal of Law & Policy

114

[Vol. 45:105

III. THE NEGOTIATION, SIGNING, AND RATIFICATION PROCESS
The Brazilian executive branch, the central and most powerful
source of international policy for the country, possesses the
prerogative to enter into treaty negotiations.4 8 Within the executive
branch, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, known as the Itamaraty, leads
the delegations for negotiating international treaties. 49 Any
documents signed by the Itamaraty delegation are sent to the Casa
Civil, or the ministerial equivalent of the presidential chief of staff.50
The president is then required to send the treaty to the Brazilian
Congress, along with an explanation, or Exposicdo de Motivos, to
begin the ratification process. 51
Brazil is recognized as having one of the most influential and
powerful executives in terms of its procedural and persuasive
influence over the legislature.5 2 Indeed, approximately 85 percent of
the legislation adopted in Brazil originates in the executive branch
and encounters little resistance from the legislature. 53 The Brazilian
Congress is not without power, however. Treaties are not effective
unless ratified by the Congress. 54 Increasingly, the Brazilian
Congress has made such ratifications subject to conditions or
reservations. 5 The ratification process for BITs, however, does not
permit automatic legislative modification. 6 Rather, the legislature
only has the power to ratify without reservations, ratify with
reservations, or refuse to ratify a BIT.5 While Congress may not
amend the text of the treaty, it can make reservations indicating its
disagreement with the text.58 At the time of the BIT ratification
debates, there was some uncertainty as to whether such reservations
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51.

Id.

52.

See MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTIAL ASSEMBLIES:

CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9-11.

58. Id. at 14.

(1992).
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would have the effect of amendments, and thus require renegotiation
at the international level. 59 The consequences of such uncertainty are
discussed in this part, infra. Importantly, the treaty ratification
process does not incorporate a presidential veto, increasing the power
of Congress in this particular area of international relations. 0
The Brazilian Congress has two chambers, both of which are
involved in the treaty ratification process. The president first sends a
treaty to the Chamber of Deputies (CD). This chamber then has a
two-step committee approval system, beginning with the gatekeeping
committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense, which approves
or disapproves the treaty and sends it to a floor vote. After this initial
committee consideration and floor vote, the treaties are submitted as
legislative decree bills to a set of two or three subject-specific
committees. In this case, the treaties were submitted to the Finance
and Taxes Committee; the Economic Development, Industry, and
Commerce Committee; and the Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship
Committee. If approved, the treaties are subject to another floor vote,
where they must receive a simple majority. Throughout this process
in the CD, debate and consideration is guided by a rapporteur chosen
by the chairmen of the committees, usually on the basis of party
position. 61 If the CD rejects the treaty, the process concludes. If the
CD votes in favor of the treaty, it sends it to the Senate, where it is
considered by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee
and is then subject to a floor vote. During this entire process,
individual delegates and senators can propose reservations (or
amendments) to the bills, which also trigger reconsideration by the
relevant committees.
The first four BITs signed by Brazil were introduced into this
62
process together. Despite the governing coalition's control over the
relevant committees, they took two years to be tabled and voted upon
at the gatekeeping committee level.63 Even with this delay, inevitable
approval was considered likely, as many of the key rapporteurs
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at n.13.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
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championed the treaties as a way to increase the country's
competitiveness and to signal Brazil's departure from typical third
world practices.64
However, after this point, the treaties received atypical and
perplexing treatment, marking an unusual departure from traditional
executive-legislative relations. The ratification process was slowed
significantly, based partially on shifting coalitions and control of
power, and partially on competing legislation. These two realities
exposed decreased advocacy and determination by the very party that
introduced the treaties-the executive. 67
On the floor and in subsequent committee considerations, the
treaties faced opposition from members of the Worker's Party (PT)a party which, at the time, had only 10 percent of Congressional
seats-as well as some members of the governing coalition.' The
treaties' scope of investment, provision of international arbitration,
most-favored nation clauses, and constitutional conflicts served as the
major sticking points.69
With regard to the scope of investment, the opposition believed
the original text allowed for speculative capital-the source of many
emerging market economic crises -to fall within the definition of
investment. 1 This, along with developing doubts regarding the
correlation between accession to BITs and increases in foreign
investment, 72 constituted the main economic concern raised by the
opposition. Because the government could not (or would not)
distinguish between the investments that could come within the scope
of the BIT, Brazil could neither prompt productive growth nor protect
64. Id. (describing Third World nations as tending to institute closed economies and
practice protectionism, often leading to dysfunctional economies when paired with political
risk).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Id. at 18-19.
69. Id.
70. See generally Dilip K. Das, Private Capital Flows and Speculative Runs in Emerging
Market Economies, 4 J. ASIA PAC. ECON. 413 (1999).

71. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 18-19.
72. For a criticism of the correlation between bilateral investment treaties and foreign
direct investment, see Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign
DirectInvestment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397 (2011).

2014]

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Brazil

117

itself against the more dangerous forms of investment.73 Thus, more
liquid and short-term capital flows, such as portfolio investments,
could be given the same protections from government restriction as
more permanent (and thus desirable) forms, such as physical
investments.74
International investment arbitration, especially under the auspices
of the World Bank's ICSID, concerned the opposition for a variety of
reasons. First, it contradicted the Calvo Doctrine that guided Latin
American policies toward foreign investment for over a hundred
years. Specifically, the creation of an international forum ran
against the Doctrine's rejection of perceived imperial imposition of
the preferences of more powerful states, as well as its advocacy for
exclusive local jurisdiction for disputes between the state and foreign
investors. 6 Nonetheless, Brazilian courts have held that commercial
and investment arbitration is constitutional. This concern about

73. Dan Wei, Bilateral Investment Treaties: An Empirical Analysis of the Practices of
Brazil and China, EUR. J.L. & ECON. 663, 672 (2012).

74. Id.
75. Wenhua Shan, From North-South Divide to Private-Public Debate: Revival of the
Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 27 Nw. J. INT'L

L. & Bus. 631, 632 (2007).
76. Id.; see also Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 19. Some states preferred that

investors be subject to the laws and standards of the nation in which they invest, rather than
being afforded the protection of an international standard of treatment that would come with a
transnational tribunal-particularly in Latin American states that had adopted the Calvo
Doctrine. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 25, 26-7 (2009); Bernardo M. Cremades, Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine
in Latin America, 7 Bus. L. INT'L 53, 55-56 (2006); James Thuo Gathii, War's Legacy in
International Investment Law, 11 INT'L CMTY. L. REV. 353, 355, 362-63 (2009); Mary Helen
Mourra, The Conflicts and Controversies in Latin American Treaty-Based Disputes, in LATIN
AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 8
(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 2008); Alejandro A. Escobar, Introductory Note on Bilateral
Investment Treaties Recently Concluded by Latin American States, 11 ICSID REV. 86-87

(1996) ("The conclusion of BITs by Latin American states is in itself noteworthy, due to the
traditional position these states have had in regard to the international legal protection of
foreign investment. . . . Their officials and scholars have advanced the exclusive jurisdiction of
the host state's courts over investment disputes and the settlement of these disputes primarily on
the basis of that state's domestic law.").
77. Julio C. Barbosa, Arbitration Law in Brazil: An Inevitable Reality, 9 Sw. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 131, 131-32 (2002); Daniel M.C. Barbosa & Pedro Martini, Two Sides of the Same
Coin: To What Extent is Arbitration with the Brazilian Administration Similar to InvestmentTreaty Arbitration?, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 37, 41 (Daniel de Andrade Levy et

al. eds., 2013) ("The understanding that the Brazilian state may submit disputes to arbitration
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arbitration was about much more than the mere procedural removal
of investor-state disputes from national courts, however. International
arbitration raised serious questions about imperialism, sovereignty,
and international arbitrators' ability or willingness to respect Brazil's
social and developmental concerns. These substantive principles
had been given a prominent place in the country's 1988
Constitution, 7 but it was unclear whether international arbitrators
would perceive themselves as bound by Brazilian law or public
policy.o The opposition's concerns were perhaps verified by
Argentina's experience with ICSID in the wake of its financial crisis
in the early 2000s."
Second, and more generally, the relationships among the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 82
the World Bank, ICSID, and BITs raised fears of arbitral support for
has been confirmed by Brazilian courts . . . ."). See also discussion infra, pages 127-28
regarding the Brazilian Supreme Court's 2001 ruling on arbitration.
78. See, e.g., Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 20 (detailing the rapporteur's concern
that bilateral investment treaties would restrict the government from regulating certain
economic matters, specifically capital).
79. Keith S. Rosenn, Conflict Resolution and Constitutionalism: The Making of the
Brazilian Constitution of 1988, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE

STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 452 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010) (describing the Brazilian
Constitution as "dirigiste and programmatic, setting out ambitious goals for reforming Brazilian
society and attempting to determine the political course of action for future governments").
80. While the arbitral seat is able to impose its standards for vacatur under the New York
Convention, it is important to recall that Brazil had not ratified the Convention until 2002.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
(June 10, 1958).
81. See Eric David Kasenetz, Note, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The
Aftermath ofArgentina 's State ofNecessity and the CurrentFight in the ICSID, 41 GEO. WASH.

INT'L L. REV. 709 (2010) (describing the negative legal treatment of the emergency measures
put into place during the Argentinian financial crisis).
82. The OECD is an intergovernmental organization with thirty-four member states that
share economic expertise with the aim of fostering economic development in emerging
economies. The member states of the OECD are known to be the most economically advanced
in the world, but membership is "limited only by a country's commitment to a market economy
and a pluralistic democracy." JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21128: ORG.
FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21128.pdf.

The thirty-four member states include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United
States. Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/

membersand partners/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
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remedies consistent with the sorts of painful neoliberal economic
reforms and standards imposed by the World Bank in response to the
series of economic crises in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s.83
Brazil had postured itself as an alternative source of development
policy,8 4 rather than adopting and embracing the economic
suggestions put forth by the World Bank and other organizations like
the OECD. This concern regarding the potential remedies imposed by
arbitrators was particularly evident among the opposition parties
standing to the left of the governing coalition. 5
Lastly, the BITs were seen as reciprocal only in the most formal
sense, because they did not impose equal restrictions on the investor
or capital-exporting states. 6 Rather, in practice, the risk and burdens
were placed on the state hosting investment, while the investor's
home state only served to benefit through expanded protections for its
constituents.8
Regarding the "most favored nation" clauses in many BITs, which
often allow investors to adopt more favorable measures than the
treaty under which they would have standing," the opposition
objected on the basis of sovereignty. Opponents urged that Brazil
should be able to form specialized agreements with particular
countries89 and offer preferred terms to those foreign investors.
Finally, there were objections that the BIT provisions requiring
"prompt, prior and effective" compensation in the case of
expropriation were in conflict with the preexisting constitutional
structure for such takings. 90 The Brazilian Constitution has provisions
regulating expropriation for various reasons and for the intended use
of the land, and sets forth different methods of calculating damages
for each. 91 This, along with a payment system of cash releases that
83. Neto, supra note 39, at 13.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. As Brazilian companies have themselves become foreign investors, the risks and
burdens of BITs will be more equally allocated between Brazil and other signatory states.
88. Stephen W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties through Most Favored
Nation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 496, 502 (2009).

89. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 19.
90. Tavela Luis & Gongalves de Andrade, supra note 45, at 118-23.
91. Id.
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requires including the payment in the following year's budget,92 is
much more detailed than expropriation and compensation, as broadly
defined and envisioned by the BITs, thus creating conflicting
standards. 93 BIT protection of the free transfer of capital also faced
constitutional opposition, as Article 172 provides for Brazilian
regulation of foreign capital investments and the remittance of
profits.9 4 Law No. 4390 specifically grants the Superinterdency
Council of the Currency and Credit the authority to impose
restrictions upon imports and remittance of foreign capital, in the
case of serious instability in the balance of payments.95
As noted supra, the first four treaties to be sent to Congress
cleared the gatekeeper committee stage only after two years, far
exceeding the amount of time generally required for the majority of
international treaties and agreements. 96 Despite the substantive
objections described supra,the delay was attributed to the procedural
demands of competing bills. 97 The three subject-specific committees
had generally favorable opinions of the treaties but required two more
years, as some opposition arose regarding specific provisions.98
Ultimately, competing versions of the bills reached the floor of the
House-one with an interpretative clause on expropriations and the
other eliminating the international arbitration provisions.99
At this point, there were significant delays in voting, due to fears
regarding the cost of doing so. 00 If the treaties had been approved
with the proposed modifications (or reservations), Brazil may have
92. Id. at 123 (observing that this requirement is not always met, and federal, state, and
municipal entities may take up to twenty years to deposit the funds in the investor's bank
account); Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 56 (observing that governmental debts resulting
from arbitral awards are to be included in the next year's budget "which will be paid in the
chronological order of their presentation," which means "private parties holding an arbitral
award against a state entity in Brazil will literally have to get in line").
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Wei, supra note 73, at 673. Balance of payments refers to the difference between
income from exports and the cost of imports. PETER J. MONTIEL, MACROECONOMICS IN
EMERGING MARKETs 29 (2d ed. 2011).
96. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 18.
97. Voting on the BITs was rescheduled twelve or more times. Id. at 19.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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been required to reinitiate negotiations with Switzerland.'or As more
of the fourteen treaties were introduced, the PT continued to
introduce amendments (or reservations) regarding free transfers,
government approval for international arbitration, and the ability of
Congress to regulate investments.102 This sent bills back to
committees, where the PT had gained control over key seats. In
addition, coalition members were beginning to shift in their opinions
regarding BITs.103 As a result, by 2000, the various treaties were
stuck in either the first or second steps of committee review, with
varying levels of modification from the original text. 104 This, again,
increased the cost of a final vote, as renegotiation was necessary with
additional countries that had already ratified the BITs.105 In
December 2002, this reality led President Cardoso to withdraw all
BITs from the Brazilian Congress, just two weeks before he was to
hand over the presidency to Luis Inicio "Lula" da Silva of the PT. 106
Despite acknowledging Congressional obstacles to ratification,
Brazilian scholars Lemos and Campello also report, based on a series
of interviews, that the executive showed a striking lack of willingness
to exercise its significant persuasive powers to guarantee ratification
of the BITs. 107 As mentioned supra, executive-legislative relations in
Brazil are characterized by an assertive and central presidency. os
Due to the fractured coalition system within Congress, deal making
and negotiation often are organized by the executive, which has the
resources and power to distribute, share, threaten to withdraw, or
actually withdraw both the perks of cabinet-level and party
appointments and "pork" for individual legislators and their
constituencies.10 9 This sort of leverage makes it entirely
understandable why the executive is the source of approximately 85
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 22.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 24.
108. Id. at 9.
109. Id. at 10. See generally Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Porkfor Policy: Executive
and Legislative Exchange in Brazil, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 87 (2005).
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percent of the legislation adopted by Congress," 0 and the creator of
urgency in the legislative process." The executive has utilized these
tools of persuasion in a very effective manner, as provisional
measures or decrees issued from this branch have rejection rates as
low as 8 percent.112 Thus, the resistance faced by the BITs, and the
overwhelming failure in their ratification process, was highly
unusual. However, Lemos and Campello point out that the BIT
ratification process is not an instance of failed executive
persuasion.11 Instead, it is more accurate to say that the executive
tools of persuasion were never truly utilized to force ratification of
the BITs, and the executive and legislative branches collaborated in
the development of other investment protections and reforms over the
same period of time. 114 This has been attributed to disparate levels of
commitment on behalf of the various elements within the executive,
with the Finance Ministry, Central Bank, and Casa Civil considering
the treaties to be much less of a priority than the diplomats in the
Itamaraty, who themselves negotiated the treaties.115
Within the executive, the Itamaraty supported ratification of the
BITs.' 16 But the other important departments within the executivee.g., the Finance Ministry, Casa Civil, and the Central Bank-did not
demonstrate commitment to or support for these treaties.11
Presumably, there was no assertive domestic constituency
encouraging ratification, and this is significant. If the failed
ratification process is attributed to the objections and procedural
wrangling of the PT, this is a story typical of the workings of the
Calvo Doctrine, and fits with the conduct of other Latin American
countries that have broken ties with ICSID. However, this
perspective fails to account for the many economic and legal policies
put into place during the same time period that do not coincide with
110. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9.
111. Simone Diniz & Claudio Oliveira Ribeiro, The Role of the Brazilian Congress in
Foreign Policy: An Empirical Contribution to the Debate, 2 BRAZILIAN POL. SC. REV. 10, 23

(2008).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 28.
Id.
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and, in fact, contradict the Calvo Doctrine and the socialist political
leanings of the main opponents of international investment
arbitration. 11

Thus, although the Calvo Doctrine principles evoked to challenge
the BITs during the ratification process may certainly have been main
points of debate for the objecting parties, the real reason Brazil chose
not to ratify the BITs may be because the key stakeholders' most
important interests were satisfied better by the other investment
protections developed during this period. The following part assesses
with more depth the various other reforms promulgated in Brazil at
the time BITs were under consideration, and evaluates the extent to
which these alternative forms of protection responded to investor and
business concerns that have traditionally been addressed through
BITs.
IV. INVESTOR PRIORITIES AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES
OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION

During the same eight-year period in which the Brazilian
Congress considered and eventually failed to ratify the BITs, it
collaborated with the executive to make great strides in several other
areas of investment reform and protection.11 9 Through this
combination of legal structures, the executive and legislative
branches met the most important needs of foreign investors while
protecting the most important interests of the state, thus substantially
eroding the perceived need for a BIT. Indeed, patterns of foreign
investment in Brazil, as compared to BIT-adopting countries,
contradict the common assumption of a necessary correlation
between BITs and FDI.120 Major elements of investment protection
identified as international standards-e.g., equal treatment for foreign
businesses, free flow of capital, access to neutral dispute resolution
mechanisms, and investment incentives-were addressed by the
118. Fernandes de Andrade & Justino de Oliveira, supra note 8, at 91.
119. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 28.
120. Fernandes de Andrade & Justino de Oliveira, supra note 118, at 87 (providing an
empirical comparison of FDJ between Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina from 1993 to 2012, as
against the number of BITs in force).
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Brazilian government during the 1990s and early 2000s.12' To a much
more limited degree, the government also addressed the desire for
arbitration. 122
A.

The Brazilian Constitution: Equal Treatment
and CapitalFlow Restrictions

As referenced supra, the nature of the Brazilian Constitution has
elevated certain rights and issues to a constitutional, rather than
legislative, level. 123 Many of the investment protections set forth by
the Brazilian government were implanted directly into the
Constitution, or had constitutional roots, elevating their protection
within the legal system. 124 One such protection is found in Article 5
of the Constitution, which provides:
All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction
whatsoever, Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country
being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, to
equality, to security and to property, on the following terms:
125

With this provision, foreign investors are assured both equal
treatment and property rights within Brazil.126 This is further
elaborated on in Brazil's extensive provisions on expropriation,
which, although different from the international standard in form,
have been acknowledged as largely similar in substance.127
With regard to free capital flows and remittance of profits, Article
192 of the Brazilian Constitution grants Congress the power to
regulate the national financial system, as well as to establish
conditions for foreign investments in domestic financial
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Tavela Luis & Gongalves de Andrade, supra note 45, at 118.
Id.

125.

CONSTITUI(iAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.).

126. Tavela Luis & Gongalves de Andrade, supra note 45, at 108.
127. Id- at 125.
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institutions.'12 Article 172 of the Constitution also provides for the
regulation of foreign capital investments and remittance of profits. 129
Under the power granted in these provisions, Congress passed the
Foreign Capital Law 30 and other pieces of legislation, which have
been described as being "nationality blind" with regard to foreign
investment.13 However, there still remains a regulatory exception in
the case of balance of payment crises.12
Foreign capital entering the country is subject to electronic
registration for monitoring purposes yet does not need to meet any set
of approvals or minimum investment authorizations.133 Additionally,
foreign capital investments are not subject to a minimum time period
within the country or any substantive approvals or authorizations
upon remittance of profits out of the country. 13 4 Under these
conditions, Brazil is thought to provide a generally free flow of
capital in and out of the country.
B. Investment Incentives: The PrivatizationProgram
and Double Taxation Treaties

The Privatization Program began in Brazil in 1990, and focused
on the sale of productive state-owned companies in the fields of steel
manufacturing, petrochemicals, and fertilizers. 13 5 In the first four
years of the program, the country sold its controlling or minority
shareholdings in thirty-three companies, earning the government $8.6
billion and transferring $3.3 billion in debt to the private sector.136
Foreign buyers dominated the second phase of privatizations, from

128.

Bruno Balduccini & Amina Akram, Investment Protection in the Brazilian Banking

Sector, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 193,200 (Daniel de Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau
de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci eds., 2013).
129. Wei, supra note 73, at 673.
130. Lei No. 4.131 de 3 de Setembro de 1962 ("Lei de capitais Estrangeiros").
131. Balduccini & Akram, supra note 128, at 205.
132. Id. at 209.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. PowerPoint Presentation, Ministry of Dev., Indus. & Foreign Trade, Privatization in
Brazil 6, 15, 29, 31 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/
sites/default/bndes en/Galerias/Download/studies/priv brazil.pdf.
136. Id.
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1995 to 2002.137 This was also the time period when public services
were transferred to the private sector in the hopes of improving the
quality of services provided to the Brazilian society.138 The Brazilian
government also initiated public offerings for Petrobras in the
petroleum industry and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce in the mining
industry.139

The Brazilian government supplemented the Privatization
Program with a policy of public service concessions and public
private partnerships (PPPs), which are regulated by the Concessions
Act and the Brazilian Public Private Partnerships Act, described
infra.140 These projects transfer the responsibility for development,
financing, construction, and operation of public services to the
private sector, while allowing the private actor to collect fees from
users upon completion. 14 Due to the dire need for infrastructure
within the country and the various guarantees provided by the
government in these PPP and concession contracts, these
development structures have become very attractive for foreign
investors. 142
Another form of investment incentive came in the form of double
taxation treaties 14 (DTTs), which were ratified over the same period
in which BITs were being considered by Congress. 144 In fact, twentyfour DTTs were approved without conditions.145 Lemos & Campello
report that industry representatives and multinational corporations
Id.
Id.
Id.
Eliana Baraldi & Jorge Vargas Neto, Investment Arbitration and Public-Private
Partnership Agreements in Brazil, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 159, 164 (Daniel de
Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci, eds. 2013).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 163, 166-67.
143. Tax treaties are usually bilateral agreements that "play a key role in the context of
international cooperation in tax matters. On the one hand, they encourage international
investment and, consequently, global economic growth, by reducing or eliminating international
double taxation over cross-border income. On the other hand, they enhance cooperation among
tax administrations, especially in tackling international tax evasion." U.N., HANDBOOK ON
137.
138.
139.
140.

SELECTED ISSUES IN ADMIN. OF DOUBLE TAX TREATIES FOR DEV. COUNTRIEs (Alexander

Trepelkov, Harry Tonino & Dominika Halka eds.), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/
documents/UN Handbook DTT Admin.pdf.
144. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 29.
145. Id. at 25.
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saw DTTs as their real priority, as compared to BITs, giving those
treaties a distinct constituency that could motivate ratification. 146 This
can perhaps be attributed to the immediate financial impact DTTs
have on investors, as opposed to BITs, which serve mainly as a
platform for dispute resolution and substantive standards in the event
that a promised investment protection is breached.
C. Commercialand Investor-State Arbitration in Brazil

In its infancy, the very institution of arbitration itself faced
challenges in Brazil. Though Congress ratified the Panama
Convention in 1995,14 passed its Arbitration Law in 1996,148 and
ratified the Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards ("Montevideo Convention") in
1997,149 arbitration was not fully accepted until the Brazilian
Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality on December 12, 2001.s0
Prior to this ruling, the Cldusula Compromissdria did not allow for
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes, whereas
the new Arbitration Law more closely tracked UNCITRAL
guidelines for deference to arbitration clauses that anticipate future
disputes, as well as pending submissions to arbitration. 5 ' After the
constitutionality of this legislation was settled, Brazil quickly became
a signatory to the New York Convention in 2002.152 Actions for
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards were first heard by
the Supremo Tribunal Federal and were then dedicated to the
Superior Tribunal de Justiga. These cases have received generally

146. Id.
147. Jonathan C. Hamilton, Three Decades of Latin American Commercial Arbitration, 30
U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1099, 1114 (2009).
148. Lei No. 9.307, de 23 Setembro de 1996, DiARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
24.9.1996 (Braz.).
149. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 13.
150. Julio C. Barbosa, Arbitration Law in Brazil: An Inevitable Reality, 9 Sw. J.L. &

TRADE Am. 131, 131-32 (2002).
151.
152.

Id.
Id.

at 138; see also JAN PAULSSON, NIGEL RAWDING & LUCY REED,

THE

FRESHFIELDs GUIDE TO ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 42 (3d ed.

2011).
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positive treatment; the rare refusals to enforce were on procedural
grounds.1 53
In the wake of this turning of the tides in the area of commercial
arbitration, the Brazilian Congress has managed to authorize state
participation in two forms of dispute resolution. First, in 2004,
Congress approved arbitration of PPP contracts, in accordance with
the Brazilian Arbitration Act. 154 In the following year, Congress
amended the Brazilian Concessions Law155 to allow for the
arbitration of disputes arising out of concessions contracts. 156
However, both of these laws are subject to two restrictions: (1) the
language of the arbitration must be Portuguese, and (2) the arbitration
must be seated in Brazil.s15
Along with these procedural conditions, there are other
requirements for arbitration against Brazil or state entitiessubjective arbitrability, objective arbitrability, and consent.158
Subjective arbitrability refers to the capacity of a party to submit its
dispute to arbitration. 159 In this case, the question would be whether
municipal law grants the Brazilian Public Administration capacity to
participate in arbitration.160 Even though state entities are not granted
legal personhood under Brazilian law, they do have contractual
capacity. 1' Thus, provisions in the Concessions Law and the PublicPrivate Partnerships Law are not specific authorizations but instead
reinforcements of the Brazilian Arbitration Act, which allows the
state to submit to arbitration-and to comply with an arbitral
award. 162

153. Hamilton, supra note 147, at 1115 (detailing the cases where the Brazilian courts
denied recognition or enforcement. Two cases were denied because the Brazilian party was
improperly summoned, three cases where there was no valid written arbitration agreement, and
one case where the arbitral award had been assigned to a third party that lacked standing to seek
recognition and enforcement.).
154. PAULSSONETAL., supra note 152, at 42.
155. Lei No. 8.987, de 13 de Fevereiro de 1995, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO, [D.O.U.] de
14.02.1995 (Braz.).
156. PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 42.
157. Id.
158. Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 39.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 41.
162. Id.
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Objective arbitrability concerns whether the dispute is capable of
being decided by arbitration.163 Under the Brazilian Arbitration Act,
this means "disputes related to freely transferrable patrimonial
rights," or rights exercised by their holder "that are not contrary to
mandatory rules of the Brazilian legal system." 164 In practice, this
refers to disputes that could be solved by the parties themselves,
without a mandatory intervention by the Brazilian courts-e.g.,
preservation of the economic-financial balance of the contract. The
parties themselves may not resolve clauses imposed by the state to
protect the public interest; these are considered inalienable. 165
Regarding consent, the absence of BITs significantly narrows the
situations in which Brazil concedes to the jurisdiction of an arbitral
tribunal. While BITs establish general consent upon which the
investor may rely, or "arbitration without privity," the Concessions
Law and the Public Private Partnerships Law merely allow the state
to be a party to arbitration. Actual consent requires an individual
contract in order to be upheld as valid under the Brazilian Arbitration
Act.16 Thus, there can be no "arbitration without privity."
With these restrictions, Brazil has created a largely local or
national-level system of investment arbitration that differs from the
ICSID model in terms of language, location, the requirements for
consent, and subject matter jurisdiction. These variances are likely to
increase the need to interact with the national court system. Although
the highest Brazilian court clarified the position of arbitration in
Brazil in 2001, Brazil's civil law judiciary and the absence of binding
precedent can lead to extensive litigation in the Brazilian court
system before or concurrent with arbitral proceedings.169 However, it
has also been urged that even without BITs and a system of ICSIDstyle quasi-precedential arbitral decisions, Brazil provides the same
level of investment protection.1 0 PPP agreements and concessions
163. Id. at 42.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 43.
166.

PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 42.

167. Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 57.
168. Id.
169.

PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 42.

170. Whitsitt & Vis-Dunbar, supra note 6.
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contracts are negotiable with regards to arbitration clauses, and the
Brazilian Constitution-along with individual pieces of legislationrestricts expropriation without compensation, provides fair and
equitable treatment, establishes strict liability by the state for its acts,
and ensures free entry and exit of investments.1 1 In addition, it has
been reported the Brazilian judiciary has consistently upheld arbitral
clauses that designate the Brazilian government and its state-owned
-172
entities as parties.
V. USING THEORY AND RESEARCH TO REFRAME BRAZIL'S
"FAILURE" TO RATIFY ITS BITS

A. Hirschman's Theory ofExit, Voice, and Loyalty
Albert Hirschman first wrote about the theory of exit, voice, and
loyalty in 1970.173 He focused primarily on markets and consumer
goods, but the theory so succinctly and elegantly outlined the
balancing factors for any organization that others soon applied it to
states and international organizations.174 Recognizing, as Hirschman
does, that all organizations are inherently unstable, the theory of exit,
voice, and loyalty serves as a method for understanding the pulls and
pushes in and out of organizations. First, we explain the theory in
more detail and then, we apply it to Brazil's refusal to ratify BITs.
Exit, which comes from the world of economics to analyze market
factors, is generally defined as the ability of one party to leave or
sever the relationship with the other party.175 Under perfect market
conditions-i.e., when there are multiple vendors offering a
particular product-consumers can easily exit. Such exit will then
communicate to a company it is not doing something right and must

171. Pedro Henrique Jardim, Note, Are Investment Protection Mechanisms Provided by
Brazilian Law as Effective as Stabilisation Clauses for Petroleum Investments?, 15 CTR.
ENERGY, PETROLEUM & MIN. L. & POL'Y ANN. REv. 9 (2013).
172. PAULSSONETAL., supra note 152, at 42.
173.

ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).

174. For example, Joseph Weiler used exit, voice, and loyalty to analyze the historic
development of the EU up to the early 1990's. Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2411 (1991). For another use of this rubric in domestic politics,
see Heather Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013).
175.

HIRSCHMAN, supra note 173, at 21.
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change in order to stay competitive. As Hirschman notes, however,
such choice of exit is not always feasible. 1 6 Consumers cannot exit
from a monopoly; workers may not exit easily from a workplace;
similarly, citizens may not exit easily from a country.
Voice comes from the world of politics and is a concept used in
political science to assess participation.1 It is "messy" compared to
exit. Voice is the concept that one party will make an attempt to
change the practices with which it is unhappy, rather than leave the
relationship. 8 As Hirschman puts it, "[V]oice is here defined as any
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable
state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to
the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher
authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or
through various types of actions and protests, including those that are
meant to mobilize public opinion."1 79
In business relations, voice occurs when consumers directly
complain to management about a product, rather than choose to go
elsewhere (i.e., complaining to Coca Cola about New Coke, rather
than buying Pepsi, or complaining to Dell about its computers, rather
than switching to Apple). In a democracy, citizens use voice
frequently. Citizens are much less likely to consider exit (moving
from the country) an option (although the continued occurrence and
controversy associated with immigration indicates that a substantial
minority of people are willing to exit their countries, depending on
their living circumstances). In a democracy, citizens voice their
disapproval through voting, protesting, expressing public opinions,
mobilizing to offer or support candidates for office, and bringing
lawsuits. 1o

176. Id. at 56. As the EU evolved, Weiler notes that one of the key developments was
closing off exit and requiring countries to follow the EU laws more closely. Weiler, supra note
174, at 2412-23. Weiler wrote his article in 1991, however, and one could argue that certain
countries have since used selective exit with the EU.
177.

178.
179.
180.
member
member

HIRSCHMAN, supra note 173, at 30.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 32. As applied to the EU, voice is shown during the early years of the EU, when
states took control over the EU Commission in order to enact the policies that the
states desired.
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So how do the concepts of voice and exit relate to each other?
Hirschman argues most organizations are dominated by one or the
other mechanism. 8 If someone tries to exit when exit is essentially
closed, as in families, clans, and some religious communities, there
will be significant penalties. 18 2 Voice then becomes the only option.
We might analogize certain international structures (e.g., the UN or
NATO) to a no-exit or monopoly situation, in which exiting is very
difficult, costly, and thus rarely used.
Meanwhile, Hirschman argues that "[t]he presence of the exit
option can sharply reduce the probability that the voice option will be
taken up widely and effectively."' 83 Yet, "the decision to exit will
often be taken in light of the prospects for effective use of voice." 18 4
According to Hirschman, since voice takes effort, it will only be used
in situations where influence is likely to work.1 5 Voice is more likely
to work for someone who is a member of an organization (e.g., serves
on the board of a company that produces consumer products) than for
an individual consumer who buys the company's products.
Ironically-and here is the problem with the interplay of voice and
exit-those members who care most about the quality of a product
are also the first ones to exit, even though their voice might be the
most persuasive. 1 6 In these cases, when exit is used by the most
influential and persuasive members, the organization itself faces
decline. Hirschman uses public schools as an example, and it is
useful to consider what happens when the most motivated and
educated parents pull their children from public school, rather than
try to improve the school.18
Therefore, Hirschman argues, we can benefit from a monopoly in
which parties cannot exit. 8 A monopoly is best utilized when exit
would drain the best and brightest-the most "quality-conscious,
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 120.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 51-54.
Id. at 55.
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alert, and potentially activist"1 89-and voice has the potential to be
effective once the members are locked in. This assertion by
Hirschman assumes, of course, that even locked-in members still
have the capacity to use voice, and such voice has the potential to
produce change.
According to Hirschman, loyalty moderates between the voice and
exit options.1 90 Loyalty makes exit less likely and voice more
effective.19 1 When an individual is loyal to an organization, he or she
is more likely to search for ways to be heard, or to gain influence or
power in the organization to which he or she is loyal. 192 For example,
parents attend school board meetings, help in the classroom, or join
the PTA. Such loyalty makes it more likely their voices will be
heard-i.e., that the improvements they suggest will happen. As for
exit, loyalty may postpone exit, but loyalty's "very existence is
predicated on the possibility of exit."1 93 Hirschman observes: "That
even the most loyal member can exit is often an important part of his
bargaining power vis-h-vis the organization."194 Indeed, the threat of
exit can actually make the person's voice more effective. 195 This
assumes, however, that the threat is implicit rather than explicit.
Explicit threats to leave, in fact, can communicate disloyalty.196
In order to optimize organizations, a mix of both voice and exit is
necessary. Even when organizations primarily rely on one
mechanism, a jolt of the other is often necessary to improve the
organization. Of course, as Hirschman notes, this requirement of both
is inherently unstable. 197
This pull and push, the balancing of goals, and the concerns raised
in the theory of exit, voice, and loyalty are all present in the context
of international investment. If a foreign company is unhappy with the
way its investment-related dispute is being treated in the host state's
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 120.
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courts, and the state refuses to change its procedures or permit exit to
private arbitration, the company may choose to withdraw its
investment and thus exit entirely from the state. Alternatively, if a
foreign company is contemplating an investment but fears how it will
be treated in the host state's courts, the company may choose to
forego investment. This logic appears to underlie arguments
regarding the need for BITs. In other words, investment arbitration
proponents argued throughout the 1990s that companies would refuse
to invest in Brazil unless the state signed and ratified BITs.198
The example of exit in Brazil, however, presents a mirror image.
Brazil chose to exit from the BITs it had negotiated, rather than
investors choosing to exit the Brazilian market. Brazil, as described
supra, is one of the largest markets to choose to exit the international
investment arbitration system. Was this, as Hirschman might
hypothesize, because of unhappiness with the product? Was this
because changing the product was more difficult than exiting? Or was
this because voice could be acknowledged and met through the
creation of different and more mutually-acceptable products?
All three of these factors explain why Brazil did not ratify the
treaties. First, as outlined supra, different elements of Brazil's
legislature were unhappy with the BITs and unpersuaded that these
treaties provided significant advantages. In the early 2000s,
Argentina offered a vivid demonstration of the troubles that could
result from arbitration pursuant to BITs. Second, the negotiation
structure itself made "voice" very difficult to exercise vis-a-vis each
treaty. Any amendment potentially meant reopening negotiations
with a foreign government and starting over. Most significantly,
legislators used their opportunities for voice as various committees
considered the treaties-and the legislators used voice again in the
creation and ratification of other treaties and legislation that protected
investors' most salient and immediate interests, while also

198.

See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES:

PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/

11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.JJ.D.11 (2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia
200911 en.pdf ("Host states wishing to attract and promote foreign investment often seek to
offer predictability to foreign investors by favouring international arbitration as the means for
investors to deal with a dispute.").
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responding to Brazil's social, economic, and political concerns.
Investors received what mattered most to them: free movement of
capital and the elimination of double taxation (also acknowledged as
primary considerations by MIGA).1 99
The story of Brazil's refusal to ratify its BITs also may reveal
some voices-i.e., the voices of the negotiating agents-as less
important than those voices of the key players. The diplomats who
negotiated the BITs certainly favored ratification of the product they
presented to the Brazilian executive and Congress. But the BITs were
simply means to accomplish the objectives of the executive and its
core departments-i.e., the Finance Ministry, Central Bank, and Casa
Civil. The voices of these departments were more important than
those of the Itamaraty, and they were willing to accept alternative
means to achieve their primary objectives.
Finally, the concept of loyalty might help to explain why the
Congress was willing to ratify or pass other legislation and might be
willing to consider further legislation or treaties. Brazilian
multinationals may well advocate for BITs in the future to protect
their own foreign investments. The Brazilian government might be
willing to listen to the voices of these loyal companies as they explain
the advantages of BITs and the investment arbitration system.
B. Brief Considerationof ProceduralJustice Research and Theories

As with Hirschman's theory, procedural justice theory and
empirical research in this area affirm the importance of voice. Indeed,
the opportunity for voice is an extremely important element that
persuades people that a decision-making or dispute resolution process
is procedurally fair. 200 This perception is important, because if people
perceive a decision-making or dispute resolution procedure as fair,
199. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
200. See E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL

JUSTICE 218 (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988); E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing, and
Reactions to Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 180 (Austin

Sarat et al. eds., 1998); see also Nancy A. Welsh, Donna Stienstra & Bobbi McAdoo, The
Application of ProceduralJustice Research to Judicial Actions and Techniques in Settlement
Sessions, in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 65-

69 (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013).
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they are more likely to perceive the resulting outcome of that
procedure as fair, even if the outcome is not what they preferred.201
People also are more likely to comply with the outcome 202 and
perceive the institution providing the procedure as legitimate.203 As
discussed briefly, infra, the willingness to judge a disadvantageous
outcome as fair and the institution as legitimate suggests the potential
for a relationship between perceptions of procedural justice and the
emergence of loyalty as described by Hirschman. 2 0
There is a vast socio-psychological literature revealing more about
voice and the other procedural elements most likely to lead people to

201. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 200, at 66-70, 205; Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice:

Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 119 (2000).
202. See Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, supra note 201, at 119; Lind,
supra note 200, at 177, 192; Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive:
Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850,
857 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 664, 660-70, 673-

74 (2006-2007) (describing procedural justice findings generally and research that has
identified "procedural justice and trust as the key antecedents of the willingness to defer to legal
authorities").
203.

See LIND & TYLER, supra note 200, at 209; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE

LAw 94-108 (1990); Lind, supra note 200, at 188; Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal
Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 871,

885-86 (1997) (suggesting that the influence of procedural justice judgments supports the idea
that "the public has a very moral orientation toward the courts" and "[t]hey expect the courts to
conform to their moral standards," especially regarding "the fairness of the procedures by
which the courts make decisions"); David B. Rottman, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
TRUST & CONFIDENCE IN THE CAL. COURTS 24 (2005), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/4 37pubtrustl.pdf; Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law, supra

note 202, at 665. See generally Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful
Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARv. NEGOT. L.

REV. 71, 95-105 (2013); Welsh, Stienstra & McAdoo, supra note 200, at 65-69; Nancy A.
Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 165 (Andrea Kupfer

Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back through the
Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants about the Place, Value and Meaning
of Mediation, 19 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 573 (2004); Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision
Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise[,] Without Procedural Justice, 2002

J. DISP. RESOL. 179 (2002); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation:
What's Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817-30 (2001).
204. See infra Part V.3.
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perceive decision-making processes and dispute resolution processes
as procedurally fair:
* Voice. First and most important, people must perceive that
they had the opportunity to express what was important to
205
them, or had voice. The more that people perceive they
had the opportunity to express what was important to them,
the more they perceive the process as fair. Voice is not
necessarily the same thing as participation or direct
engagement in the give-and-take of negotiation. Indeed,
people's perceptions of their level of participation or direct
engagement in negotiation have less effect than simple
voice on their procedural justice perceptions. 206
* Respectful treatment from the decision maker. Second,
people must perceive that they were treated in a respectful
and dignified manner. 207
205. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 200, at 211-12; Lind, supra note 200, at 180; Tyler,
Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, supra note 201, at 121 (describing voice as the

opportunity for people to present their "suggestions" or "arguments about what should be done
to resolve a problem or conflict" or "sharing the discussion over the issues involved in their
problem or conflict" and also noting that voice effects have been found even when people know
they will have little or no influence on decision makers); Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control,
and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. Soc. SCI.
171, (2005); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to
Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 488 (2010) (reporting that

voice "shapes evaluations about neutrality, trust, and respect" and has the "strongest influence,
followed respectively by neutrality, trust, and respect"). It should be noted, however, that
people are also aware of their vulnerability to manipulation, and if they perceive evidence of
unfair treatment or perceive "false representations of fair treatment," they respond with
"extremely negative reactions." See Lind, supra note 200, at 187; see also Tom R. Tyler,
Kenneth A. Rasinski & Nancy Spodick, Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders:
Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 72, 73-74

(1985) (explaining that under certain conditions, voice without decision control heightens
feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with leaders, a result described as the
"frustration effect.").
206. See Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical

Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 447-52 (2010) (distinguishing between clients' direct
participation and indirect participation as their lawyers negotiated on their behalf); see also
Roselle L. Wissler, Party Participation and Voice in Mediation, 18 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 20

(2011).
207. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of ProceduralJustice: A Test of the Group-Value
Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 830 at 831 (1989); E. Allen Lind et al., In the Eye
of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'Evaluationsof Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 953, 958 (1990); Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, supra
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* Even-handed treatment, neutrality of forum. Third,
people must perceive that they were treated in an evenhanded manner, and that the forum was neutral-or at least
not predisposed against them. This element can be
understood in both structural and interactional (or even
relational) terms. In terms of structure, people need to
perceive that the role of the decision maker or dispute
resolution forum is to make decisions or resolve disputes by
applying fair and objective standards. In terms of
interaction, people also need to perceive that the particular
decision maker actually tried to be open-minded and treat
their arguments in the same manner as others' arguments
were treated, even if specific outcomes differed. 208 Tom
Tyler has asserted that people watch for "cues that
communicate information about the intentions and
character" 209 of the decision maker-cues, for example, that
the decision maker has tried to apply objective standards
carefully, fairly, and in a well-meaning manner, based on
relevant and objective factors. 210
note 201, at 122; Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, infra note 221, at 419-20. While
respectful treatment is described here as an essential element of procedural justice, it has also
been described as an element of interactional justice, and even of distributive justice. See
Robert J. Bies, Are ProceduralJustice and Interactional Justice Conceptually Distinct?, in
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 85 (Jerald Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt eds.,

2005).
208. See Tyler, Does the American PublicAccept the Rule of Law?, supra note 202, at 664

("Transparency and openness foster the belief that decision-making procedures are neutral.");
see also Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-ComponentModel of ProceduralJustice:
Defining the Meaning of a "Fair"Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747

(2003) (distinguishing between "formal" or "structural" aspects of groups that influence
perceptions of process fairness, such as group rules, and the "informal" influences that result
from an individual authority's actual implementation of the rules).
209. Tyler, Does the American PublicAccept the Rule of Law?, supra note 202, at 664.
210. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure,supra note 201, at 122; see also Tyler,
Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 202, at 853-54; Tom R. Tyler,
Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of ProceduralJustice: A Test of
FourModels, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 333, 337 (1987).
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* Trustworthy consideration from the decision maker.
There is substantial overlap between the former element
and this fourth element. People seek cognitive reassurance
that the decision maker has heard and accurately
understood 211 what they said. People also seek relational
reassurance that the decision maker sincerely considered
what they said and that they can trust the decision maker.2 12
Both cognitive and relational theories explain the influence of
procedural justice. Cognitively, people want to be reassured that
decision makers will be fully informed before coming to their
decisions. 213 Provision of the opportunity for voice, the demonstration
of understanding, and even-handed treatment in a neutral forum
respond to this desire. Research indicates, however, that people are
influenced by procedural fairness even when they have been told that
their voice will not influence the outcome.2 14 Thus, procedural justice
researchers now theorize that procedural fairness serves as a fairness
"heuristic." 215 Though heuristics generally are useful and well
211. See Lind, supra note 200, at 179.
212. See D.E. Conlon et al., Nonlinear and Nonmonotonic Effects of Outcome on
Procedural and Distributive Fairness Judgments, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1083, 1095

(1989). Note that trust is itself a nuanced concept. For example, efficient commercial relations
rely on "calculus-based" trust, the reliable delivery of promised or desirable behaviors, based on
an instrumental cost-benefit analysis. Alternatively, trust may be "identification-based," with
such complete identification, understanding, and appreciation that one person can act for the
other. See RoY J. LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION 288 (5th ed. 2005); see also HollanderBlumoff & Tyler, infra note 219, at 494; Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of

Law?, supra note 202, at 671 (noting that research demonstrates that people's inferences about
legal authorities' trustworthiness are central to their reactions).
213. This is called "instrumental" or "social exchange" theory. See Lind, supra note 200, at
179.
214. Id. at 180-81.
215. See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 224, 225 (1993) (reporting

researchers found that procedural justice judgments strongly influenced litigants' decisions
about whether or not to accept nonbinding arbitration awards, regardless of whether litigants
were individuals, small business owners, or corporate officers; only corporate employees
demonstrated no link between their procedural justice judgments and their decisions to accept
awards); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the
FederalCourts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 137 (2011) (citing Kees van den Bos et al., How Do I
Judge My Outcome When I Do Not Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology of the Fair
Process Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1034, 1034 (1997)); MacCoun, supra

note 205, at 171, 185-86 (describing fairness heuristic theory).
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grounded, their effectiveness also can reveal the workings of
cognitive bias. 216
From a relational perspective, people want to know they are
valued members of the social group and will be treated fairly.2 1
Therefore, people also use their perceptions of procedure to assess
whether they can trust decision makers and their procedures. 218 Being
able to trust in this manner can help them to manage the vulnerability
associated with uncertainty.219
Applying procedural justice theory and research to Brazil's choice
not to ratify the BITs, it becomes quite clear that Brazilian legislators
had substantial voice during the four years spent in the ratification
process. As noted supra,however, the nature of the treaty ratification
process limited the effect their voices could have on the treaty itself.
Indeed, the proposed modifications to the treaty likely would have
required renegotiation. Importantly, however, the executive's

216. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, 64 ALA. L. REV. 389 (2012) (generally

examining the different views of heuristics, with some commentators focusing on the errors
caused by heuristics and other commentators describing them as reflecting "ecological
rationality"). See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SC. 1124 (1974); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). There

is a growing recognition of the extent and effects of implicit bias and unconscious bias. See,
e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias
across the Legal System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563 (2013).
217. See Donald E. Conlon et al., supra note 212; see also Tyler, Psychological Models of
the Justice Motive, supra note 202, at 858.
218. See Nancy A. Welsh,
The Reputational Advantages of Demonstrating
Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28 NEGOTIATION. J. 1, 117

(2012); Robert K. Vischer, Big Law and the Marginalization of Trust, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
165 (2012).
219. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
473, 477 (2008) (citing E. Allan Lind, Fairness Judgments as Cognitions, in THE JUSTICE

MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002)); Kees van den Bos &
E. Allan Lind, Uncertainty Management by Means of Fairness Judgments, 34 ADVANCES IN

EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 26-30 (2002); see also Nancy A. Welsh & Barbara Gray,
Searching for a Sense of Control: The Challenge Presented by Community Conflicts over
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 295 (2002). Even

though the focus of the "group value" theories is relational rather than cognitive, there is other
research indicating people are indeed likely to judge in-group members more favorably and
treat them better than out-group members. Therefore, relational concerns should not be
understood as the opposite of cognitive concerns. Ronald J. Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in THE
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 166-67 (Deutsch & Coleman eds., 2000).
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response in this instance was neither heavy-handed nor manipulative,
and instead created the opportunity for the emergence of alternative
measures. The substance of these measures suggests that the
executive and legislators listened to, and understood, each other and
the most important concerns expressed by both the opponents and
proponents of the BITs.
C. The Relationship between ProceduralJustice and Loyalty

Although Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty describes
the effects of loyalty, it does not do much to explain how loyalty
emerges. Nor does Hirschman's theory acknowledge the independent
value of listening, sincere and trustworthy consideration, expressing
understanding, and demonstrating respect. Hirschman's focus instead
is on concrete change in response to voice.
Procedural justice research and theories regarding the importance
of listening and trustworthy consideration may help to explain the
emergence of loyalty. More specifically, when a state, workplace, or
other organization offers trustworthy consideration, as well as evenhanded and dignified treatment, the organization is responding to
voice in a manner that is likely to enhance compliance and
perceptions of legitimacy.220 These, logically, should also enhance
loyalty. They may even encourage further voice. Such voice and
consideration have been found to be correlated with increased trust,
enhanced information sharing, and a greater likelihood of developing
responsive integrative solutions, 221 just as occurred in Brazil. Based
on procedural justice theory, however, enhanced compliance,
perceptions of legitimacy, and loyalty are more likely to occur even if
the organization does not provide the outcome that those expressing
themselves wanted.

220. See, e.g., Andrea K. Schneider & Natalie Fleury, There's No Place Like Home:
Applying Dispute Systems Design Theory to Create a ForeclosureMediation System, 11 NEV.

L.J. 368 (2011) (discussing the perceptions of participants in a foreclosure mediation process).
221. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 416
(2010); Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 219, at 473 (also observing that such behaviors
do not reduce negotiators' effectiveness in arriving at beneficial distributive outcomes); Welsh,
The Reputational Advantages of Trustworthiness, supra note 217 (proposing a mutually-

supportive relationship among a cooperative negotiation style, procedurally just behaviors,
perceptions of trustworthiness, and a reputation as an effective negotiator).

142

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 45:105

Of course, there are and should be limits to the occurrence of
these effects. Persistent failure to respond to voice with concrete
change, especially when such response is forthcoming for others who
are no more (or even less) deserving, will undermine loyalty.222 But
the effects of procedural justice may help to explain why there need
not always be concrete change in response to voice, provided there is
trustworthy, sincere, respectful, and even-handed consideration of
what has been said.
VI. CONCLUSION

When viewed from the perspective of theory and research,
Brazil's decision to enact alternative legislation and constitutional
provisions, rather than ratify BITs, represents a successful means to
acknowledge disparate voices, avoid foreign investors' exit, and even
enhance loyalty. It is only from the perspective of the negotiators of
the BITs and the proponents of international arbitration that this
decision might represent a failure.
Importantly, however, Brazil's choice does not represent an
unqualified success. While the system of national-level constitutional
and legislative protections, contractual consent to arbitration with the
state, and economic investment incentives has served Brazil well over
the past decade, there are certain aspects of this dynamic that can be
detrimental to those foreign investors who encounter difficulties.
Most strikingly, there are certain aspects of arbitration with the
Brazilian Public Administration under the Brazilian Arbitration Act
that do not match the neutral dispute resolution provided by a
detached international forum. Automatic application of Brazilian law
as the applicable substantive standard in arbitration with the state can
put foreign investors at a disadvantage, due to the many protections
222. People are aware of their vulnerability to manipulation, and if they perceive evidence
of unfair treatment or perceive "false representations of fair treatment," they respond with
"extremely negative reactions." See Lind, supra note 200, at 187; see also Tyler, Rasinski &
Spodick, supra note 205 (explaining that under certain conditions, voice without decision
control heightens feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with leaders, a result
described as the "frustration effect"); Robert J. MacCoun, supra note 205, at 171, 188-93
(describing the potential for the manipulative use of procedural justice and "false
consciousness").
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the Brazilian government can give itself in the legislative process. 221
In addition, the designation of Brazil as the seat, Portuguese as the
language, and Brazilian law as the applicable law severely limits the
available neutrals who can sit as arbitrators in disputes against the
state, especially outside of Brazil.224
Additionally, as Brazil has become a capital exporter, rather than
merely an importer like many of its peers in Latin America, the
Brazilian government now finds it has its own international investors
to protect. 5 Without BITs, Brazilian companies investing abroad are
subject to the local laws of the host country, as is true for foreign
entities in Brazil." 6 Although Brazilian companies have engaged in
very creative workarounds by incorporating in other states with
favorable BITs,22 it is probably not in Brazil's interests to force its
corporations to fend for themselves in this manner. Thus, there will
be a need, once again, for an opportunity for voice and responsive
listening, and the definition of success will continue to evolve.
223. Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 49, 56-59. See BG Group PLC v. Republic of
Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014), and Corparacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v.
Pemex-Exploracion Produccion, 962 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (examples of legislation
adopted by signatories to BITs that investors perceived as placing them at an unfair
disadvantage).
224. Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 52.
225. See Neto, supra note 39, at 3-4.
226. Id. at 10-11.
227. See also Fernandes de Andrade & Justino de Oliveira, supra note 8, at 90 (urging
there is not a need for Brazil to enter into BITs, pointing out the disadvantages of arbitration
pursuant to BITs versus individually-negotiated contracts, and explaining the advantages of
Brazil's evolving administrative structure-including more decentralized agencies, the
development of quasi-independent agencies, incorporation of arbitration, and collaboration with
nation-specific chambers of commerce (e.g., Brazil-Canada)).

